Abstract. In this paper, we address the logic of knowing why under the extensions with ideas from dynamic epistemic logic, namely public announcements. Through the additional notions present in the knowing why context, we consider two possible variants, namely the extensions by (i): public announcements of a formula and by (ii): public announcements of reasons, although the deeper analysis of the latter is left for future work. Following to this, we consider another logical operator, the conditional knowing-why operator, for which we study the applications to the axiomatization of public announcements as well as the solely framework. At the end, we consider the logical expressivity of these different logics in comparison to each other. We show one of the main problems with the usual process of proving completeness of the higher logic through translation.
Introduction
The logic of knowing why, as introduced by Xu, Wang and Studer in [13] , considers a synthesis of ideas emerging from justification logic together with the notions of epistemic logic to provide a framework for reasoning not only about knowing formulas but also knowing why in the concrete sense of knowing explanations for formulae in all concerned worlds of an agent. For this, the authors introduced a new modal operator Ky a in extension to the basic epistemic framework. This synthesis, although (conceptually different) considered by others before in different realizations like e.g. in Fittings work [2] , promises interesting applications, especially after an enhancement by dynamic notions, in a same way as it was done for the core parts separately, like in classical dynamic epsitemic logic and e.g. for justification logic by Renne in [4] and e.g. [5] . Although dynamic epistemic logic encompasses many different formalizations, we consider public announcement logic for the extension. While originally introduced by Plaza in his seminal work [3] , we will manly adapt, and refer to, the presentation in the monograph [7] and therefore also to the embedding in the whole class of dynamic epistemic logics.
As there are two different kinds of notions concerned, namely solely knowing and knowing why(or knowing reasons) we also can imagine two notions of public announcements from this context. Either publicly announcing that a formula has to hold or even publicly announcing why a formula has to hold. The second one could then follow the ideas and concepts presented by Eijck, Gattinger and Wang in [8] . We will only examine the first notions in this paper, i.e. an enhancement of the logic of knowing why with classical public announcement operators is considered. We then find that, in difference to usual ehancements by public announcement operators, the logic of knowing why bears some deeper semantical idiosyncrasies in cooperation with these notions, making a classical axiomatization impossible. We then introduce a relativized version of the knowing-why operator, following suggestions made in [13] , to provide a possible workaround for these problems. As a main goal, we provide an axiomatization of this latter logic which is then proved sound and complete with respect to the basic model classes presented in the original paper.
We then consider expressivity comparisons between the logic using public announcements and the logic incorporating the relativized knowing why operator. Together with this, we address the problem of proving completeness in the standard sense of providing a translation for the other logics presented and discussed here.
Preliminaries
The main purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the work done about the logic of knowing why, by Xu et. al. in [13] , to create a common ground on which the dynamic extensions and other modifications later take place. For the following, it's assumed that the reader is familiar with the basic notions of propositional classical modal logic, Kripke-frames and the concepts of basic epistemic logic.
2.1. The logic of knowing why. The logic of knowing why, in the following denoted by ELKy in correspondence to the initial paper, is syntactically defined with the BNF L ELKy : φ ::= p | ¬φ | (φ ∧ φ) | K a φ | Ky a φ with p ∈ P and a ∈ A. The sets P and A used here are respectively the sets for the atomic propositions, being countably infinite, and the countable set of agents. Obviously, L ELKy denotes the respective language as the set of well-formed formulae build from this BNF. All other general connectives like →, ↔ as well as ⊥ and ⊤ are defined in a similar way to classical propositional logic. Following the general notations of epistemic logic, the dual of the modal operator K a is defined as K a φ = ¬K a ¬φ. As it follows naturally, while K a reads like the agent a knows ... is the case, the new modal operator Ky a read like the agent a knows why ... is the case.
The semantics of the the logic ELKy were defined in a model-theoretic sense with following the approach of Fitting models for justification logic, i.e. a ELKy-model M = W, E, {R a | a ∈ A}, E, V is defined over (i) a non-empty set of worlds W , (ii) a non-empty set of explanations, (iii) an own accessibility relation R a ⊆ W ×W for each agent a ∈ A 1 , (iv) an admissible explanation function E : E × L ELKy → 2 W and (v) a basic evaluation function V : P → 2 W . A pointed version of a model, i.e. a combination of a model and a designated world is then denoted by (M, w).
As it was defined in the initial paper, the set E holding possible explanations for formulae has to satisfy two conditions, namely (1) holding a designated explanation e and (2) being closed under the explanationcombination operator · : E × E → E, i.e. s, t ∈ E implying (s · t) ∈ E. With E being independent of an agents view, it can be seen as an omnipresent domain of explanations.
The explanation function, relating the worlds w ∈ W to a formula φ and an explanation s where s is perceived as an explanation of φ, also has to fulfill two conditions about its behavior, namely (1) whenever the formula is in a designated set Λ, it holds that E(e, φ) = W and (2) the function E is distributed over the (MP) rule with E(s, φ → ψ) ∩ E(t, φ) ⊆ E((s · t), ψ). This designated set Λ was defined by the authors as the tautology ground, simply a set consisting of valid formulae, which represent a fixed argumentation ground for all agents which are agreed self-evidently true.
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The accessibility relations R a for all agents are in the following required to be so called S5 relations, i.e. being (i) reflexive, that for all w, (w, w) ∈ R a , (ii) transitive, that for all w, u, v, if (w, u) ∈ R a and (u, v) ∈ R a , then (w, v) ∈ R a and (iii) symmetric, that for all w, u, if (w, u) ∈ R a then (u, w) ∈ R a . Although there are many other classes of models, defined over different restrictions of the accessibility relations, the main emphasis will be on those S5 models.
3
The local satisfiability, namely the validity of a formula in a specific world of a model, is then defined over the relation |= with the classical propositional axioms (PT)
From φ ∈ Λ, infer ⊢ Ky a φ (NKy) Figure 1 . The system SKY
Public announcements of formulas
As the main purpose of this paper, we will now consider the logic of knowing why under the extensions with the operator for public announcements of formulas. The basic notions and definitions about this new operator are then defined according to the common notions of classical public announcement logic PA. We will denote this new logic with PAFKy where P AF emphasizes the announcement of formulas additionally. Definition 1. For a countable set of agents A, a countably infinite set of atomic propositions P, the language of the logic PAFKy is defined with
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A.
Obviously, PAFKy is simply an augmentation of ELKy by the public announcement operator [ ] filled with a to-announce formulae φ. Verbally, the construct [φ]ψ translates to "after the public announcement of the formula φ, it holds that ψ". The semantics of this augmented logic are again defined over the same S5-relational models M, being constructed as presented in the preliminaries. Following to this, the satisfaction relation |= now gets extended for the handling of this new notion with
The construct (M|φ, w) represents the pointed version of an extended(or updated ) model, M|φ, with the following construction.
Definition 2. The model M after the public announcement by φ,
Note, that E from the previous model is not changed in the "augmentation" process. This comes from the fact that the set is simply the set of explanations not related to the set of worlds in any direct way(only over the function E). For the right hand definition of W ′ , we will write [[φ] ] M in the following. One can also imagine the operator | of the change of a model by a public announced formula φ as the function | : KyS5×L P AF Ky → KyS5.
The corresponding dual to this operator [φ] is denoted by φ ψ and semantically defined by the following: (M, w) |= φ ψ iff (M, w) |= φ and (M|φ, w) |= ψ Like for the classical modal-type operators, this dual corresponds to the notion of possiblity. Following the classical way of axiomatizing public-announcement-type logics over reduction-style axioms, we're considering the Hilbert-style calculus presented in [13] for the underlying logic ELKy as shown in the preliminaries together with the axiomatization for propositional public announcement operators [3] . Therefore, we first consider the following additional axioms used there to axiomatize the basic public announcement logic P A:
An axiomatic system PAFKY, for our presented logic PAFKy would on first sight just be SKY+((P A1)−(P A5)) together with one or more additional axioms for the combination of both public announcements of formulae and the knowing-why operator. This results in being the main issue for these considered logic. For the purpose of a better insight to the problem, we consider the following expansion of the semantic evaluations of a formula of the form [φ]Ky a ψ.
Let M and w ∈ W be arbitrary:
From this equivalences, we suppose that there is no basic formula in the logic ELKy which is able to express this matter equally with a reduction like in the axioms shown above, i.e. pushing the announcements further into the formula, since modifying ψ results in some problems concerning the integrity of E in the evaluation. We concretize this assumption through the following theorem.
Theorem 1. PAFKy is more expressive than ELKy.
Proof. We sketch the model-theoretic considerations. Since PAFKy is an extension of ELKy, it can't be less expressive. Now, consider the following two models
For M 1 , we consider a set of worlds containing two elements w 1 , w 2 , we assume that E contains two basic elements s, t besides the usual conditions, R a is expected to be total for all agents a. For E, we set E(s, p) = {w 1 }, E(t, p) = {w 2 } while the rest are set to ∅. For the basic evaluation function V , we finally set V (p) = {w 1 , w 2 } and V (q) = {w 1 }. Visually, this model may be imagined as the following:
Suppose that M 1 is a submodel of M 2 . Therefore, we will only mention the additional settings. We consider an augmented set of worlds by a third world w 3 , together with a third contained basic explanation r ∈ E. R a is still considered to be total for all agents and we additionally require E(r, p) = {w 3 } and V (p) = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 }, V (q) = {w 1 , w 3 }. We may imagine this second model in a slightly reduced representation as:
In PAFKy, we may distinguish these model through the formula [q]Ky a p in the designed world w 1 contained in both models. For M 1 , we find that the only world left after the announcement made in w 1 is w 1 itself which provides (
To show that there exists no φ ∈ L ELKy which can distinguish between the reasons from only w 1 and w 3 , we suppose the opposite. If so, then φ = q → Θ for some Θ ∈ L ELKy . By q used in the implication, we exclude the case of q being un-announceable in w 1 . By the semantics of [q]Ky a p, Θ would then have to model the behavior of (M|q, w 1 ) |= Ky a p, i.e. the behavior of Ky a p restricted to all q-worlds.
By a simple induction on the structure of Θ, it can be seen that no such formula exists, since to express something about the reasons of p in reachable worlds, the only possibility is to include Ky a p as some subformula which itself can not be limited to some subset of worlds over the use of ¬, ∧, K a or Ky a (which form the induction steps).
In the proof, it became apparent that although the sub-case [φ]K a ψ is expressible over an adequate translation, we have no other possibility of expressing something concerning the explanation function E than the operator Ky a ψ and for this purpose, there can be no modification of ψ as it would mess with the before mentioned integrity of E by changing the concerned formula for the existence of explanations, i.e. there is no way to restrict the application of E. Through this theorem, we can obviusly not apply Plaza's method from [3] to provide completeness over reduction.
3.1.
A relativized knowing-why operator. To address this problem, we're following the ideas of [6] , where the authors used this concept of relativization for problems concerning common knowledge, and of [11] , [12] from the context of non-classical epistemic logics, by relativizing the Ky a operator to a conditional one, namely Ky r a (φ, ψ), with the following semantics related to the semantics of the construct shown above:
This operator relates to "the agent a knows why ψ, under the condition φ". Clearly, the original, unary, operator Ky a φ corresponds to Ky r a (⊤, φ). Two new versions of the logics presented before, namely ELKy r and following to this P AF Ky r are directly emerging from this, simply with
with p ∈ P and a ∈ A and L P AF Ky r being simply the augmentation of ELKy r with the notion of the [φ] operator as shown above. The class of models associated with this new logic, named Ky r S5 for the S5-relational version, are structurally similar to the KyS5-models presented before, while the semantic evaluation of Ky in |= is exchanged with the definition for Ky r .
Proposition 1.
The following formulae are valid in the class of all S5-ELKy r -models.
In the following proofs, let M be an arbitrary model and w ∈ W an arbitrary world.
. By the rules of |=, the first one translates to ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ R a and (M, v) |= φ implies (M, v) |= ψ → χ and v ∈ E(t, ψ → χ). The second one the translates to ∃s ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ R a and (M, v) |= φ implies (M, v) |= ψ and v ∈ E(s, ψ). By meet over W, R a , E and φ, we have:
(ii): The formula translates to ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ R a and (M, v) |= ⊥ implies (M, v) |= φ and v ∈ E(t, φ). This obviously relates to the structure of the formula ⊥ → ψ ≡ ⊤, which immediately implies (M, w) |= Ky r a (⊥, ψ).
(iii): Suppose (M, w) |= Ky r a (φ, ψ). By this, we have ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ R a and (M, v) |= φ implies (M, v) |= ψ and v ∈ E(t, ψ). By cutting out E, we have ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ R a and (
(iv): Suppose that (M, w) |= Ky r a (φ, ψ). Now, we consider any v ∈ W with (w, v) ∈ R a and u ∈ W with (v, u) ∈ R a . By the transitivity of the relations, we have (w, u) ∈ R a implied. By (w, u) ∈ R a , we have ∃t ∈ E : ∀u ∈ W : (w, u) ∈ R a and (M, u) |= φ implies (M, u) |= ψ and u ∈ E(t, ψ), therefore (M, v) |= Ky [χ]
λ-worlds χ-worlds
We can even consider a stronger representation of the distribution of formulas in the Ky r operator by taking different premises into account.
The first one translates to ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ R a and (M, v) |= χ implies (M, v) |= φ → ψ and v ∈ E(t, φ → ψ), while the second translates to ∃s ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ R a and (M, v) |= θ implies (M, v) |= φ and v ∈ E(s, φ). By meet over W , R a and E, we have ∃t,
. By the laws of modus ponens, we have (M, v) |= ψ for the latter and by the properties of E, we have
For illustrating this property of composition further, one can imagine this situation by the following worldannouncement diagram shown in Fig. 2 . Of course, the so labeled announcements shall be seen as the constraints in the operator Ky The validity (i) from Prop. 1 is obviously a special case of Prop. 2 with both χ and θ representing the same formula.
Axiomatization of ELKy
r . As an axiomatization for the logic of ELKy r , we propose the here shown Hilbert-calculus (Fig. 3) as an axiomatic and rule based extensions to the system SKY from the initial paper. In correspondence to the before-mentioned paper, we call this system SKYR.
The axiom (EKyR) provides, as mentioned before, a stronger version of the distribution of conclusions by modus ponens using different premises. The axiom (DKyR) defines the decomposition of the Ky r operator into a specific instantiation of the basic knowledge operator K and axiom (4YKR) provides the positive introspection of Ky r by the classical operator K. One may wonder about the axiom (5YKR), the negative introspection of Ky r by the operator K, which is actually provable, exactly as its unconditioned companionen (5YK) was either in the basic system SKY(s. Proposition 11, [13] ). 
From φ and φ → ψ, infer ψ (MP) 
From this point on, we can almost immediately consider the soundness of our system SKYR by finally proposing the following. Proof. Suppose that φ ∈ Λ and consider an arbitrary formula ψ. Let M be an arbitrary model. Since Λ only contains tautologies, we have (M, w) |= φ for all w ∈ W . By the first rule regarding the behavior of E, we have that ∃e ∈ E : ∀w ∈ W : w ∈ E(e, φ). Therefore, we also have ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ R a implying these explanations for every agent. Therefore, we also have ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ R a and (M, v) |= ψ imply (M, v) |= φ and v ∈ E(t, φ) since t can always be at least e.
Theorem 2 (Soundness of SKYR over Ky r S5). The system SKYR is sound with respect to the class of all S5 − ELKy r -models.
Proof. This theorem is easily obtained by considering Lem. 1, Prop. 1 and Prop. 2 together with the fact, that the ELKy r -models are based on the standard Kripkean-S5-models making the standard S5 axioms valid.
3.2.1. Completeness. For the proof of completeness' sake, we follow the common approach by considering a canonical model being defined over all maximal consistent sets with the(later more explicitly defined) common properties like truth in order to provide the framework for a somehow standard proof of a completeness theorem in the context of modal logics. For this, we first consider:
Definition 3 (Consistency). A set Γ is called consistent (in a specific system), if Γ ⊢ ⊥. Otherwise, it is called inconsistent, Γ ⊢ ⊥. Following to this, a set is called maximal consistent if
Following from these considerations, we now define a canonical model with one world for each maximal consistent set over the following definition.
Definition 4 (Canonical model for SKYR). The canonical model for SKYR is defined as the tupel
with E c being defined over the BNF t ::= e | (φ, ψ) | (t · t) with φ, ψ ∈ L ELKy r , W c = {w Γ = Γ, F, {f a | a ∈ A} }, with (1) Γ being a maximal conistent set
which satisfy the following conditions:
The design choices have been made in coorperation to the basic ideas of [13] about the there presented canonical model for SKY. For further procedure, we first need to show that the model itself is well defined according to the specifications shown in the preliminaries as in some cases these properties may not be as obvious anymore.
Before proceeding to the proof of the well-definedness of M c , we first adapt a helpful proposition concerning the accessibility relations from [13] . (1) Ky (2): The proof is completely similar to the proof of Proposition 16, (2) in [13] .
Following to this, we now propose: Proposition 5. The canonical model M c for SKYR is well defined, given the conditions for ELKy r (ELKy)-models.
Proof. The proof is split into two parts, concerning on the one side the two conditions (1) and (2) for the explanation function E and on the other side the accessibility relations covered in R c being equivalence relations.
Claim: E c satisfies the conditions (1) and (2) presented in the preliminaries for the general prototype of the function E. Proof: (1): Concerning the first property, suppose φ ∈ Λ. Consider a world w Γ = Γ, F, f ∈ W c . By condition (ii) concerning the worlds of the canonical model, we have (e, (ψ, φ)) ∈ F with any ψ ∈ L ELKy r . By the definition of E c , we have therefore w Γ ∈ E c . Since w Γ was arbitrary, we have E c (e, φ) = W c .
(2): Concerning the second property, suppose w Γ ∈ W c as above with w Γ ∈ E c (s, φ → ψ) ∩ E c (t, φ). Therefore, there exists χ, λ ∈ L ELKy r with (s, (χ, φ → ψ)) ∈ F and (t, (λ, φ)) ∈ F . By condition
Concerning the accessibility relations, we consider the following:
Claim: For any a ∈ A, R r a is (i): reflexive, (ii): transitive and (iii): symmetric. Proof: In the following, we consider the three arbitrary worlds w Γ = Γ, F, f , w ∆ = ∆, G, g and w Θ = Θ, H, h together with an arbitrary agent a ∈ A. (i): Obviously, it hold for w Γ , that we have f a = f a . Now, for all K a φ ∈ Γ, we have φ ∈ Γ by axioms (T) and the deductive closure of max. consistent sets, therefore (w Γ , w Γ ) ∈ R With these two claims, the canonical model M c from Def. 4 follows all conditions presented for ELKy rmodels.
In order to fully proof the functioning of the canonical model, we have left to show that W c is not empty, and following [13] , we provide a construction of the corresponding F and f for a given Γ, by that showing that there exists one world w Γ for every maximal consistent set Γ in the language of L ELKy r .
Definition 5. Given any maximal consistent set Γ, construct the corresponding world parts F Γ and f Γ as the following:
For the set F Γ , consider as a base
For the set of functions f Γ , define ∀a ∈ A : f Γ a (φ, ψ) = (φ, ψ). From this construction, we can now consider the following proposition providing the non-emptiness of W c .
Proposition 6. For any maximal consistent set Γ,
Proof. Since it is already supposed that Γ is maximal consistent and since ∀a ∈ A, the function f → ψ) ), (t, (λ, φ)) ∈ F . By the construction of F Γ over the union, we have that
In the following, we will now reestablish the existence lemmas for both K a and Ky r a following the ideas of [13] in order provide the last necessary helps to consider the truth lemma. The key of both existence lemmas is to provide constructions of worlds related by an accessibility relation which refute either the formula itself or any possible explanation in some way, provided that the corresponding K a or Ky r a formula is not member of the to-speak set.
Proof. Suppose K a φ 1 ∈ Γ, i.e. ¬K a φ 1 ∈ Γ. For the desired properties, consider
∈ Γ} ∪ {φ | K a φ ∈ Γ} and then define the world w ∆ = ∆, G, g as the following:
For the set ∆, consider the extension of ∆ − to a maximal consistent set. For the set G, consider as a base 
For the set of functions g, define ∀b ∈ A :
Obviously, ∆ − can only get extended to a maximal consistent set if it is consistent in the first place, which still remains to be shown. This leads us to the following.
Claim: ∆ − is consistent. Proof: Proof by contradiction, i.e. suppose that ∆ − is inconsistent. Then there exists some finite subset Θ ⊆ ∆ − \ {¬φ 1 } consisting of m Ky r a -instances and n χ-instances for each K a χ such that
For all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we have Ky r a (φ i , ψ i ) ∈ Γ by the definition of ∆ − . Since Γ is said to be closed under deduction, we have K a Ky r a (φ i , ψ i ) ∈ Γ by (4YKR). Also, for all j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have K a χ j ∈ Γ per definition of ∆ − . From the second theorem in the calculus SKYR from above and the fact that we have now all assumptions present in Γ, we infer K a φ 1 ∈ Γ. This contradict our supposition of K a φ 1 ∈ Γ.
On the other hand, it is still left to show that the by that constructed world follows the conditions of the canonical model. Claim: w ∆ ∈ W c if constructed from the above given premises. Proof: Since ∆ is said to be maximal consistent, we just need to show the condition
By construction of the successor for any n, we have (s · t, (χ ∧ λ, ψ)) ∈ G k+1 ⊆ G.
(ii): Suppose φ ∈ Λ, thus (e, (ψ, φ)) ∈ F . Since w Γ , therefore F is well-defined according to the conditions of W c . Therefore (e, (ψ, φ)) ∈ G 0 by construction, i.e. (e, (ψ, φ)) ∈ G.
Now, by construction of w ∆ , we have ¬φ 1 ∈ ∆ and (w Γ , w ∆ ) ∈ R c a for a given w Γ with K a φ 1 ∈ Γ. Lemma 3 (Ky r a existence lemma). For any world w Γ ∈ W c , if Ky r a (φ 1 , φ 2 ) ∈ Γ then for any (t, (φ 1 , φ 2 )) ∈ F , there exists w ∆ ∈ W c with (w Γ , w ∆ ) ∈ R c a such that (t, (φ 1 , φ 2 )) ∈ G. Proof. Initially suppose that Ky r a (φ 1 , φ 2 ) ∈ Γ and that (t, (φ 1 , φ 2 )) ∈ F (with w Γ = Γ, F, f ∈ W c ). Now, construct w ∆ = ∆, G, g as follows: 
For the set G, consider as a base
and as a recursion step
Ky r a (χ, φ → ψ) ∈ Γ and (r, (χ, φ → ψ)) ∈ G n−1 : Following from the second premise, (r, (χ, φ → ψ)) can be located in any G k \ G k−1 with 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 or in G 0 . If (r, (χ, φ → ψ)) ∈ G 0 , we have r ≻ t by (IB), thus s ≻ t. If (r, (χ, φ → ψ)) ∈ G 0 , we consider the said number k and the corresponding set G k \ G k−1 by which we again have r ≻ t.
(4): Ky r a (λ, φ) ∈ Γ and (u, (λ, φ)) ∈ G n−1 : If we follow the second premise again, we can again either find a k with 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 and (u, (λ, φ) ) ∈ G k \ G k−1 or we have (u, (λ, φ) ) ∈ G 0 . Both immediately lead to u ≻ t, i.e. s ≻ t.
With this, the proof of the second property is extremely simplified.
Claim: (t, (φ 1 , φ 2 ) ) ∈ G for the given premises of the lemma. Proof: By the construction of G, it is enough to show, that for all k ∈ N, (t, (φ 1 , φ 2 φ 2 ) ) ∈ G 0 . From the previous claim, we know that if Ky r a (φ 1 , φ 2 ) ∈ Γ, t can never exists solely in any successor of a given set G k , since it would always be a proper sub-term, therefore (t, (φ 1 , φ 2 )) can't be added in any G k , therefore (t, (φ 1 , φ 2 ) ) ∈ G.
By that, all conclusions have been drawn from the premises using the claims.
Following from these considerations, we now propose the truth lemma corresponding to our canonical model M c . q) as, although w 1 is not considered in the evaluation of the E-clause because of the before mentioned condition, we still find that there does not exists a uniform t ∈ E for the left-to-consider worlds w 2 and w 3 . Therefore, we find that (M, w 1 ) |= Ky r a (p, q).
Lemma 4 (Truth
The main difference exploited here is the missing φ-implication in the semantical definition of Ky r a (φ, ψ). In the following argument though, it can also be seen that even a corresponding modification has no possibility in providing an adequate translation. For this, we introduce a second concept from the original paper [13] .
Definition 6 (Factivity Property). A model M has the factivity property(is factive), if whenever w ∈ E(t, φ), then (M, w) |= φ.
Obviously, for a facitive model M, M and M F coincide. The following lemma now asserts that the ELKyformulas are neutral in respect to facitvity.
Lemma 5 (Xu, Wang, Studer [13] ). For any φ ∈ L ELKy , model M and w ∈ W , (M, w) |= φ if and only if (M F , w) |= φ.
We obtain the following generalization for ELKy r .
Lemma 6. For any φ ∈ L ELKy r , model M s.t. w ∈ W , (M, w) |= φ if and only if (M F , w) |= φ.
Proof. Proof by induction on the structure of formulas. We leave the classical propositional and modal cases unconsidered, as M is only possibly different from M F in the explanation function. Thus consider Ky r a (φ, ψ):
, we automatically have v ∈ E(t, ψ) and by (IH), we obtain (M, w) |= Ky r a (φ, ψ). Lemma 7. There exists φ ∈ L P AF Ky , a model M and w ∈ W such that (M, w) |= φ but (M F , w) |= φ.
Proof. Consider the following model M(reflexive arrows are not shown, but expected)
and its factive counterpart M F , where we loose all explanations for K a q as in every world x, by (M, 2) |= q, we find that (M, x) |= K a q as the relation R a is total among these worlds: 
may be completed at the top which is a contradiction to Lem. 7. Corollary 1. PAFKy r has greater expressivity than ELKy r .
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Proof. Since ELKy r is contained in PAFKy r , it can't be more expressive. By Thm. 4 and Lem. 7, there exists a formula φ ∈ L P AF Ky which can't be expressed in ELKy r . As PAFKy r contains PAFKy, we have greater expressivity.
By this argument it can be seen that a relativized knowing-why operator does not suffice to imitate public announcement behavior in the logic of knowing why, thus leaving a rest of void it initially intended to fill. Although we leave further inspections for future work, we still want to advocate for the consideration of the use of non-standard semantics for public announcements, namely context-dependent semantics, which seems like a promising alternative way of dealing with the laid out problems. 4.1. Using non-standard semantics. The following semantic concepts for public announcement logic are mainly due to Wang in their current form, see [10] and [9] . For providing a small recollection of the basic notions of context-dependent semantics of the operator [φ], we consider another semantic relation |= ρ , similar to the classical |=, but induced with a formula ρ ∈ L P AF Ky r providing a specific evaluation context. For the behavior of this new relation, one may consider the following(only the interesting cases are provided, i.e. the out-carrying of the relation over ∧, ¬ is obviously following the old structure as the main difference lies in the many-world context). This new induced handling of compositions of public announcement should make it possible to find a simple reduction axiom like φ → Ky r a (φ ∧ ψ, χ) as a proposition. But on deeper insights, the whole idea of a conditionalized versions of the knowing-why operator may(or should) be completely unnecessary in this new context. The axiomatization and the more intensive study of this semantics in this context are left as future work.
Another use of different semantics may lie in restructuring the semantics of Ky r a itself. Such a different semantic definition shall obviously provide a possibility for translation between the relativized versions and the versions incorporating the public announcements. This, for example, is enabled by the following semantics:
(M, w) |= Ky r a (φ, ψ) iff ∃t ∈ E : ∀v ∈ W : (w, v) ∈ R a and (M, v) |= φ implies (M|φ, w) |= ψ and v ∈ E(t, ψ) Obviously, through the enforcement of the φ-restricted model only in the continuing evaluation of φ, we avoid the problems laid out before. From this, we may translate [φ]Ky a ψ to φ → Ky r a (φ, ψ), although it seems to require a quite different approach of axiomatization. Additionally, the usual idea of introducing a relativized operator, i.e. leaving the context updated models, is discarded which doesn't get along with the usual spirit.
Conclusions
In this paper, the logic of knowing why under the extension with public announcement operators for formulas was addressed. Through the difficulties arising with providing of a reduction-based axiomatic system, we considered another logical operator, namely the conditionalized version of the basic Ky-operator to provide a partial workaround. Following to this, as the main result of this paper, we proved the new axiomatic system concerning the logic using this relativzed operator as being sound and complete with respect to the basic S5-class of models following the definition of the initial paper [13] . A conditionalized version of the canonical model presented in [13] and [11] , [12] is here provided in order to achieve these results. In the following section, we then considered the problem of expressivity between the different logics in discourse, where we found that ELKy r does not fulfill its reduction promise as hoped and so lies as an intermediate among ELKy, PAFKy and PAFKy r concerning its expressive power.
